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 Abstract 
A variety of theories concerning the determinants of public spending on education exist, but an 
encompassing one has yet to be formulated. Frequently examined determinants are regime type 
and globalization, but the empirical results for these variables are not consistent across studies. 
This paper contributes to the literature by anecdotally demonstrating that insufficient theory 
can lead to a lack of empirical robustness. Thereto, three different empirical models are 
replicated and altered. It is shown that changes in the sample, the inclusion of an additional 
variable or a different measurement method can lead to differing estimates. This instability is 
sometimes exacerbated by statistical shortcomings such as autocorrelation. In this study, both 
the results for regime type, measured by democracy, and globalization, captured by log trade 
openness, vary across samples and models, showing positive or insignificant effects. Regarding 
log trade openness, cross-country and within-country effects seem to differ systematically, 
which is contrary to previous findings and inexplicable by current theory. Given the lack of 
robustness, interpretation of results has to be careful and a consistent theory is needed as 
guidance for empirical analysis with external validity. 
Keywords: Replication, Panel Data Analysis, Robustness, Public Spending on Education, Trade 
Openness.  
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Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.  
Nelson Mandela 
1 Introduction 
Education is a universal human right and has also been shown to have numerous positive 
socio-economic effects, of which economic growth is a very prominent example (Lucas, 1988; 
Mankiw et al., 1992; Barro, 2001). This importance has led to a lively debate on education and 
education policy. In case of formal public education, governments ultimately determine the 
supply, e.g. by school construction policies or, more generally, by spending on education. So, 
what induces governments to target their expenditures on education? Why do some 
governments spend more on education than others? What are the determinants of public 
education spending? 
Research on these questions has explored several explanations; the most popular ones 
being regime type and globalization. More democratic countries are often assumed to spend 
more on education due to higher pressures from the constituency (Brown and Hunter, 2004; 
Avelino et al., 2005; Stasavage, 2005; Ansell, 2008) and more open countries are often said to 
invest in education to remain competitive (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Rudra and 
Haggard, 2001; Avelino et al., 2005; Ansell, 2008). Although a variety of theories coexists, a 
consistent and encompassing one is still lacking.  
In addition, empirical results are inconclusive, as both the effect of regime type and 
globalization are not consistent across studies. This may be due to the fact that only partial 
effects are investigated, with an often arbitrary choice of controls. The lack of consistent 
theory, that ideally guides empirical analysis, might thus be one reason for the variability of 
empirical results.  
In contrast to the few authors (e.g. Rudra and Haggard, 2001; Plümper and Martin, 2003) 
who briefly take note of the problem outlined above, this paper clearly demonstrates and 
addresses some of the consequences of lacking theory. This is done by investigating the 
robustness of three different empirical models for government spending on education 
(Mulligan et al., 2004; Stasavage, 2005; Ansell, 2008).  
First, it is shown that close replication without the original dataset is extremely difficult 
and that the empirical results are not robust to an alteration of the original samples. 
Second, the robustness of the replicated results is further examined by including an 
additional variable (for Mulligan et al., 2004 and Stasavage, 2005) and by using a different 
measurement method for a variable already included (for Ansell, 2008). For all three models, 
this variable is log trade openness, a commonly employed measure that captures an important 
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effect of globalization. As suggested by Avelino et al. (2005) and in contrast to Ansell (2008), 
the measure of trade openness is based on purchasing power parities (PPP).  
Regarding log trade openness, a robust positive and significant effect is found in different 
cross-country analyses, but the within-country effects turn out to be insignificant. These results 
cannot be explained by current theory and the statistical explanations offered here are only 
tentative. Concerning the effect of regime type on education spending, the results of this paper 
are also inconclusive, varying by definition of the variable and specification of the model. 
Moreover, the statistical robustness checks show that many models might also be questioned in 
terms of econometric validity.  
The discussion section points out several problems of the empirical analysis that arise due 
to the lack of theory, ranging from the choice and measurement of variables to econometric 
issues and interpretation problems. As robustness and thus external validity are often 
questionable, inference is likely to be unreliable. 
Since a consistent theory cannot be offered here, it is not possible to reveal the true 
determinants of public education spending. However, it is shown that exactly this is also the 
problem of some published and peer-reviewed articles. Thereby, this paper reinforces the call 
for increased data sharing (e.g. Eichengreen, 2013), more general equilibrium theory (e.g. 
Acemoglu, 2010) and a careful interpretation of empirical results (e.g. Rodrik, 2013). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: first, the relevant literature is reviewed 
with respect to both theoretical and empirical findings and the main problems are briefly 
addressed. Second, the empirical strategy is outlined, the data are described and the three 
models are replicated, extended and subjected to statistical robustness checks. In the last 
section of the empirical part, the results as well as their implications are discussed, and the last 
section concludes.   
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2 Theoretical and empirical context 
A variety of theories concerning the determinants of government spending exists. Here, 
government spending is dealt with in general, as education can be seen as a subcategory of 
public goods. This has the advantage of providing a more complete picture because the general 
literature on government spending is more extensive. Where necessary, particularities of public 
education spending are explained. Two mutually non-exclusive ways of categorizing this 
research have been proposed:  
1. Two different schools of determinants of public spending are identified by Mulligan et 
 al. (2004); the first concentrating on the role of the voting mechanism and the second 
 emphasizing the importance of economic and demographic variables.  
2. A classical demand and supply categorization of influences on government spending 
 has been proposed by Hausken et al. (2004). 
Both views can actually be combined by arguing that the voting literature investigates how 
the regime type constraints the way governments maximize their support, which in turn 
determines the supply side of government spending (Lake and Baum, 2001). Economic and 
demographic variables, on the other hand, describe the society and the international framework 
in which the country is embedded. This determines the demand for public policies. 
The supply and demand framework clearly offers the advantage of general equilibrium 
analysis once a coherent theory will have been formulated. In what follows, the relevant 
literature is systematically presented in this supply and demand framework. 
2.1 The supply side of government spending 
2.1.1 Theoretical framework 
Theories that (partially) explain “the conditions under which governments are willing to 
satisfy the constituents’ demands” (Hausken et al., 2004: 241) usually start with the assumption 
that governments are utility or support maximizing (e.g. Lott, 1999; Lake and Baum, 2001). 
Rational and opportunistic political leaders are assumed to face trade-offs and have to mitigate 
distributional conflicts, but their main interest is to stay in office (Plümper and Martin, 2003; 
Stasavage, 2005). Usually, governments are either modeled as monopolistic firms providing 
public goods (e.g. Lake and Baum, 2001) or they are assumed to choose an optimal 
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combination of rents and public goods (e.g. Plümper and Martin, 2003). Although heavily 
simplifying, these models are sufficient to trace the effects of different regime types.1  
The type of the political system can be interpreted as constraints on how politicians pursue 
and reach their goal of support maximization (Lake and Baum, 2001): democracies are 
characterized by lower costs of political participation, lower barriers to exit, and thus higher 
political competition. In addition, a more competitive political system is argued to produce 
better institutions, such as rule of law, which increases accountability (Stasavage, 2005). 
Accountability in combination with high political participation leads to a removal of the 
incumbent if a certain limit of rent extraction is exceeded (Baum and Lake, 2003). This 
credible threat works as an effective constraint on rent-seeking. On the contrary, the costs of 
political participation are higher and accountability is lower in non-democracies. Therefore, a 
higher level of rent extraction is tolerated (ibid.). Elections, as the means to remove politicians, 
can thus be interpreted as an constraint that lowers rents and thus increases provision and 
spending on public services (Lake and Baum, 2001.) More specifically, Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. (2003: 289-292) argue that the coalition feature of democracy helps explaining public 
expenditures: in their selectorate theory, the size of the winning coalition is positively linked to 
higher expenses, as a larger constituency that has to be satisfied.  
This can be seen as a rough and general supply side explanation2 of government spending 
(on education), that is supported by the majority of the literature3 and which leads to the first 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Democracies spend more on education than non-democracies. 
2.1.2 Empirical findings  
A positive effect of democracy is found by a variety of articles that use various variables 
measuring overall government spending, the size of government or welfare effort (e.g. Hicks 
and Swank, 1992; Rudra and Haggard, 2001; Adsera and Boix, 2002; Rudra, 2002; Avelino et 
al. 2005). Table C.1 in the appendix provides a detailed overview of the empirical models that 
                                                          
1
 In what follows, regime type refers to the political organization of the state. In accordance with the majority of 
the literature, only a rough distinction between democracies and non-democracies is drawn with the voting process 
being the distinctive feature of a democracy. It should be kept in mind that the real distinction is much more subtly 
nuanced.  
2
 While regime type is the most investigated supply side effect, some articles propose other or additional effects. 
One example is corruption, that is investigated by Mauro (1998) and Gupta et al. (2002) and that can be 
interpreted as a special case of rent-seeking. Higher corruption therefore is expected and shown to result in lower 
spending on public goods or a shift of government spending towards more targetable goods.  
3
 Alternative explanations exist but they often concerns a subcategory of non-democracies and do not directly 
address the differences between democracies and non-democracies (e.g. Lott, 1999). Yet, they can be seen as an 
argument why Hypothesis 1 will not necessarily hold in empirical analysis. Therefore, they are presented in the 
empirical section. 
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are briefly presented in the following.4 This table also contains the empirical demand side 
models described in section 2.2.2. 
Plümper and Martin (2003) show that the level of democracy and spending is correlated in 
a U-shaped fashion: governments in non-democracies tend to mainly spend on rents in order to 
gain support. With a rising level of democracy, this practice becomes too expensive and 
expenditures are shifted towards public goods. With further increasing political participation, 
governments have the incentive to spend even more which leads to overinvestment in public 
goods and less efficient spending. This relationship is confirmed by Hausken et al. (2004) in a 
follow-up piece. 
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) argue that the effect of regime type depends on the 
category of spending. While they find no difference in aggregate government spending 
between democracies and non-democracies in Latin America, more democratic governments in 
this region seem to spend more on education.  
These results are confirmed by a variety of studies with different samples that examine 
public education spending in particular. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) confirm the 
theoretical derivation from the above framework: if accountability is high and leaders can be 
easily exchanged, governments have greater incentives to spend on education than on rents. In 
a global sample, they show that the sizes of the winning coalition and the selectorate induce 
higher spending on education (ibid: 289-292). Brown and Hunter (2004) examine Latin 
America and confirm that democracies spend more on primary education, because the 
government caters to a larger constituency. Avelino et al. (2005) confirm the strong positive 
impact of democracy on education spending in the same region and show how demand side 
effects reinforce this finding.  
Stasavage (2005) examines education spending in Africa and finds a positive effect of 
democracy that mainly operates through increased spending on primary education. He explains 
this finding with the fact that democracy also lends a voice to the rural population that 
otherwise faces high costs of collective action. Ansell (2008) arrives at the same conclusion for 
a global sample and provides an additional rationale why non-democracies may spend less: 
once the optimal level of education is reached, further investment in education leads to 
unemployment or a reduction in skilled labor wages. This, in turn, can lead to social unrest or 
even revolutions (Campante and Chor, 2012). 
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 Note that not all articles uniquely focus on the empirical model discussed below. Several papers also propose 
models for other social spending categories (e.g. Mulligan et al., 2004) or for a particular education sector (e.g. 
primary education as in Stasavage, 2005). 
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While the majority of the literature provides theoretical arguments and empirical results 
showing that democracies do spend more on public goods and education in particular, some 
counter arguments have been made: Lott (1999: S130) suggests and demonstrates that 
totalitarian regimes, a subcategory of non-democracies, use education as a means to 
indoctrinate the citizens since “higher levels of totalitarianism produce diminishing returns to 
controlling the citizenry through force and increase the marginal return to indoctrination”. The 
same holds true for rising levels of opposition. Therefore, high levels of opposition and high 
levels of totalitarianism induce increased spending on education. Brown and Hunter (2004) 
argue that autocracies might want to increase education for developmental reasons or to 
maintain legitimacy. Using Cuba as an example, they claim that if non-democracies have an 
interest in investing in education, they might even be able to mobilize more resources than 
democracies.  
Lastly, Mulligan et al. (2004) find no significant difference between democracies and non-
democracies in terms of spending on public education. Although this is contrary to their initial 
hypothesis, they explain this finding by arguing that policy decisions are trade-offs that “are 
basic to human nature and not specific to particular political institutions” (ibid: 72).  
In sum, different theoretical and empirical findings exist. With the majority hinting at a 
positive relationship between democracy and public spending on education, Hypothesis 1 can 
be seen as partially confirmed.  
2.2 The demand side of government spending 
2.2.1 Theoretical framework 
Demand side determinants of government spending include characteristics of the society as 
well as the country’s stance in the world community. In contrast to the supply side literature, 
research on the demand side seems to be broader but less integrated, ranging from effects of 
globalization, wealth and heterogeneity to individual and household characteristics. While all 
approaches are of interest, the most debated issue of demand side determinants in cross-country 
analyses is the effect of globalization. Thus, and in order to keep the overview manageable, this 
literature overview is restricted to globalization.5 
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 Future research should incorporate the most important supply- and demand-side effects into a more parsimonious 
model. Yet, extending the rough framework and testing the resulting hypothesis is beyond the scope of this paper.  
Especially individual and household characteristics play an important role not only in forming the demand for, but 
also the actual usage and outcome of education. But cross-country comparisons are inherently difficult and usually 
studies focus on one or a few countries in the same region (e.g. Mason and Rozelle, 1998).  
In addition, ethnic diversity of the population is an interesting part of country characteristics that influence the 
demand side. Apart from differing tastes, it can lead to increased rent seeking and therefore also negatively affects 
public spending (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993 and Easterly and Levine, 1997). Social inclusion, in contrast, appears 
to have a mitigating effect (Gradstein, 2003).  
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Two opposing views exist on the trade-off between efficiency and welfare that comes 
along with globalization; the efficiency and the compensation hypothesis that are explained in 
detail by Garrett (2001). The efficiency hypothesis claims that governments see themselves 
forced to cut spending to remain competitive in the world market. Increased levels of 
globalization are therefore expected to decrease public spending. The compensation hypothesis, 
in contrast, focuses on political incentives to expand the public sector. It assumes that 
globalization creates an environment of uncertainty, social dislocations and unequal 
distributional effects for the individual, in which governments help compensate for the 
increased risk, e.g. by paying higher unemployment benefits (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 
2001). Therefore, more globalization is expected to increase public spending. In sum, the effect 
of globalization on overall government spending depends on whether the efficiency or the 
compensation theory prevails. 
Concerning education, governments’ expenditure decisions might differ, as it is a special 
category of government spending (e.g. Avelino et al., 2005; Ansell, 2008). Spending on 
education can improve labor supply and enhance productivity, in which case increased 
expenditures leads to greater efficiency. These positive effects are likely to be larger for less 
developed countries that still have lower productivity, which leaves higher potential for 
improvement (Ansell, 2008). With respect to education spending, the efficiency and the 
compensation hypothesis are thus not mutually exclusive (Avelino et al., 2005).6  
Furthermore, demand for education is subject to labor market effects that determine the 
returns to education. These effects depend on the degree of a country’s openness since in an 
open economy, skilled labor can move abroad, whereas in closed countries, an increase in 
education can lead to reductions in relative wages for skilled labor (ibid.). Thus, in closed 
economies, the elite will prefer private education, profiting from higher relative wages since 
private education is not subject to externalities and leaves the rest of the population unskilled. 
In more open (globalized) economies, public spending on education is therefore expected to be 
higher. 
In contrast to overall government spending, where the effects of globalization are 
ambiguous, public education spending is expected to increase with higher levels of 
globalization, which leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of globalization increase government spending on education. 
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 Note that this implies a steady relationship of globalization and spending on education, that is in contrast to the 
U-shaped relationship of democracy and general government spending found in some studies. This difference 
highlights the already mentioned fact that the effects explaining education spending might differ significantly from 
the effects that influence overall public spending.  
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2.2.2 Empirical findings 
For both general government spending and education expenditures, the results are mixed. 
In empirical analyses of the effects of globalization on general government spending, a strong 
focus on OECD countries exists.7 In this particular sample, the evidence is mixed, but it rather 
favors the compensation than the efficiency hypothesis (Garrett, 2001). In a broader sample, 
Rodrik (1998) and Adsera and Boix (2002) show a positive relationship of globalization and 
government expenditures, whereas Quinn (1997) finds the opposite.  
In a sample of less developed countries, Rudra (2002) finds a negative effect which she 
attributes to a decline in labor’s power to demand compensation. This result is consistent with 
Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001), who examine Latin America and find a negative effect, 
also emphasizing the fact that factories have greater exit options than workers. In the same 
region, Avelino et al. (2005) find a positive effect of globalization. Other authors find no effect 
of globalization (Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Iversen, 2001; Rudra and Haggard, 2001). 
Focusing on education spending, Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) do not find any 
significant effect of globalization in Latin America. In contrast, Avelino et al. (2005) find a 
positive effect of globalization on education spending in the same region. In a broader sample 
of developing countries, Rudra and Haggard (2001) show a negative relationship of 
globalization and public education spending which they relate to the influence of non-
democracies on public spending. According to Avelino et al. (2005), this negative effect could 
also be due to non-governmental influences such as labor unions or left-wing parties that are 
often less present in developing countries than in OECD nations. Structural deficiencies such as 
weak tax collection systems might also influence the relationship between globalization and 
public spending (ibid.). In a global sample of 113 countries, Ansell (2008) finds a positive 
effect of globalization. 
In sum, the effect of globalization on overall public spending varies with the sample and 
the same holds true for education spending. Previous research is thus inconclusive concerning 
Hypothesis 2. 
2.3 Remarks on previous research 
The issue with the empirical findings presented above has already been noted in the 
context of general public spending and also holds true for public spending on education: “The 
main problem of an econometric estimate of government spending arises from the almost 
complete lack of a theoretically founded baseline model” (Plümper and Martin, 2003: 39). 
Nonetheless, little has changed during the last ten years. In general, it appears that 
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 This is mainly due to a lack of consistent data in other samples (Garrett, 2001). 
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reconciliation of previous and differing research is often neglected in favor of contributing 
“something new”, even if this contribution is the investigation of another partial effect, e.g. on 
the demand side, that might turn out to be very different in general equilibrium analysis or in a 
different sample and therefore lacks external validity.  
The lack of a consistent theory implies that the control variables are chosen rather 
arbitrarily, which is why the articles differ significantly in this regard. While most articles that 
focus on demand side effects control for democracy, only a some supply side authors (e.g. 
Plümper and Martin, 2003; Avelino et al., 2005; Ansell, 2008) consider the effect of 
globalization when trying to explain education spending or other social spending categories. 
This has already been criticized by Rudra and Haggard (2001).  
Moreover, different definitions and assumptions lead to differing variables. For instance, 
dependent variables are, inter alia, total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP 
(e.g. Mulligan et al., 2004), total spending on education as a percentage of total government 
spending (e.g. Stasavage, 2005) or log education spending per capita (e.g. Brown and Hunter, 
2004). Furthermore, some authors focus on levels of the dependent and independent variables 
while others examine changes in those variables. Globalization is also captured in various 
ways, e.g. by trade openness (Rudra, 2002), institutional openness to trade (Plümper and 
Martin, 2003), capital mobility (Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo, 2001) or financial openness 
(Avelino et al., 2005). Table C.1 clearly shows the variability of variables and measurement 
methods. 
It is therefore not surprising that previous research has produced results that differ 
significantly across samples and models. This paper aims at enriching the above presented 
literature by making the robustness of empirical models its central theme. Instead of briefly 
mentioning the problem, some empirical problems caused by the lack of theory are examined, 
clearly highlighted and straightforwardly discussed. This will hopefully encourage future 
research to make an attempt to build an encompassing model as a theoretical guidance to 
empirical estimation. 
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3 Empirical analysis 
The empirical analysis tests the robustness of three different empirical models proposed by 
Mulligan et al. (2004), Stasavage (2005) and Ansell (2008). These models have been chosen 
for several reasons with the most important ones being data availability and accessibility. 
Moreover, all three models use the same dependent variable which was expected to assure 
some comparability of the results. Lastly, the authors use different data and samples, which 
allows to assess whether the results are consistent across samples. Mulligan et al. (2004) 
conduct a cross-sectional analysis of a global sample, whereas Stasavage (2005) examines 
time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data of African countries and Ansell (2008) uses a dynamic 
model for TSCS analysis of a global sample. 
This section is organized as follows: first, the strategy is outlined; second, the data and 
their sources are presented. Third, the models are replicated, extended and subjected to 
robustness checks. In the last part, the results as well as their implications are discussed. 
3.1 Strategy 
The three models are examined one by one, but the strategy is the same for all three of 
them. First, the relevant hypothesis of the respective article is stated, the empirical model is 
explained and the most important findings are briefly presented. 
Second, the original model is replicated as closely as possible. For comparability reasons, 
the data used in the present paper correspond as precisely as possible to the data of the 
replicated models; the same applies to the estimation technique. Replication results and 
problems are briefly discussed and it is shown that minor alterations, e.g. due to data 
availability, may yield rather different results.  
Third, the replicated models are tentatively tested for omitted variables by including an 
additional variable. As the literature shows some support for adding globalization to the 
empirical analysis of public education spending, the replications of Mulligan et al. (2004) and 
Stasavage (2005), that do not include such a measure, are extended by one additional regressor. 
One of the most frequently used measures of globalization is trade openness, the sum of 
exports and imports over GDP.8 As explained below and as suggested by Avelino et al. (2005), 
the trade openness measure used in this paper has the denominator adjusted for PPP. This 
implies that Ansell’s (2008) model is altered insofar as the measurement of the trade openness 
variable differs from replicated model, which employs an unadjusted measure.  
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 Different measures of financial openness, e.g. private capital flows, are also commonly employed. Yet, in this 
analysis, one additional variable suffices to test the robustness of other models. As theory is lacking, the choice is 
rather arbitrary anyways.  
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Lastly, both the replicated and the extended models are subjected to specific statistical 
robustness checks, mainly focusing on the fulfillment of the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
assumptions. General concerns that are common to all models, such as omitted variables and 
endogeneity, are addressed in the subsequent discussion section. 
3.2 Data and variables 
The dependent variable is in all cases total public spending on education as a percentage of 
GDP from UNESCO, replicated in the World Bank Development Indicators (WDI). All models 
include a measure of regime type, a variable capturing the structure of the population as well as 
a measure of GDP. Other controls vary by model – for the rationale of including them, please 
refer to the respective articles. The main data sources are the WDI and other frequently 
employed measures such as the POLITY IV score.9 All variables, their respective sources and 
transformations are listed in Tables B.5-B.7 in the appendix; Tables B.2-B.4 show the 
summary statistics. It has to be noted that data availability and quality varies significantly 
across countries.10  
The relationship of democracy and education spending is investigated more often and a 
measure of democracy is already included in all three replicated models. Therefore, the 
variable of main interest is trade openness that is less frequently examined and has yielded 
mixed results in previous research. Here, trade openness is adjusted for PPP. In contrast to the 
commonly used measure, that uses GDP figures based on real exchange rates (in the 
denominator), the PPP-based one offers a more precise picture of trade relative to the size of 
the economy.11 Since exchange rates are determined on the basis of tradables ignoring the non-
tradable sector, using them as conversion factor may distort GDP figures: given arbitrage, 
export and import prices should have a lower cross-county variance than prices of non-tradable 
goods. In developing countries, where labor is comparatively cheap and thus non-tradable 
goods inexpensive, exchange rate based measures of GDP are likely to underestimate the true 
value of non-tradables in those countries. This, in turn, leads to an overestimation of trade 
relative to the economy, a shortcoming of the conventional trade openness variable. Therefore, 
the denominator of the trade openness variable used here is PPP-adjusted.12 Table B.1 in the 
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 Since the Polity score measures democracy on a scale of -10 to 10 but codes e.g. cases of transition with -88, all 
observations that score below -10 are omitted. Otherwise, they would result in a negative bias. 
10
 Potential problems are briefly discussed in Section 3.4.1. For a more in-depth discussion see e.g. Stasavage 
(2005). He also shows how data imputation techniques can be used for robustness checks. Unfortunately, this kind 
of robustness check is beyond the scope of this paper.  
11
 For a more detailed explication see Avelino et al. (2005). 
12
 Note that the numerator is not subject to such distortions as both imports and exports are subject to the law of 
one price. Moreover, it would be difficult to adjust these figures for PPP as the conversion factors are usually 
calculated especially for GDP adjustments. 
12 
appendix contrasts the commonly used trade openness measure and the PPP-based one. It can 
be seen that the latter has a lower within-country variance which Avelino et al. (2005) claim to 
be more realistic. Finally, the trade openness measure is used in logarithmic form which is 
consistent with Ansell’s (2008) transformation of unadjusted trade openness and the 
logarithmic form of other variables, e.g. GDP and population, in all replicated models.13 
Regarding other variables, only Mulligan et al. (2004) provide a complete dataset which 
makes a perfect replication possible.14 The replication of the two remaining articles is more 
complicated since the authors do not provide their original datasets. Moreover, they sometimes 
lack explicit explication of their variables and sources. In these cases, common measures that 
arguably fit the idea and estimation of the respective model are used. 
3.3 Empirical results 
3.3.1 Cross-sectional analysis of a global sample: Mulligan et al. (2004) 
The authors hypothesize that under non-democratic regimes, groups are prevented from 
“express[ing] their intensity of preference for economic and social policy” (p. 54), which 
would result in a positive and significant coefficient on the democracy variable – consistent 
with Hypothesis 1. 
Mulligan et al. (2004) use 1960-1990 averages of all their independent variables and 1980-
1990 averages of the dependent variable. Hence, they have comparatively few observations 
(114), which provides cross-country regression evidence. Using normal standard errors, they 
estimate the following model with OLS: 
 = 	 + 	 +  +     (eq. 1) 
where 	 is a constant, 	 is the average of the democracy index from the POLITY IV 
data from 1960-1990,  is a vector of averaged control variables and  is the error term. The 
included control variables are a dummy variable for communist countries and one for British 
legal origin, the share of elderly in the population, a measure of total population, real GDP per 
capita as well as the share of value added from agriculture. A measure of trade openness is not 
included.  
3.3.1.1 Replication 
Since the authors provide their dataset and as the estimation method is clear, the original 
results and the replicated ones are the identical (see Table 1, regressions (1)-(4)). Since the 
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 Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 also show estimations using an untransformed trade openness measure. 
14
 Replication without the use of their dataset yields very different results due to data ambiguities. These 
estimations are not reported here. 
13 
overall picture of the variables with respect to sign and significance is more important here 
than the actual size of the coefficient, the latter is not the main focus in the discussion of the 
results. Until a robust empirical model is presented, the discussion concerning the size of the 
estimated effects seems rather unessential. 
The coefficient on the democracy score is positive but not significant at any conventional 
level. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is not confirmed. Public spending on education seems to be higher in 
communist countries, in smaller states and maybe in countries of British legal origin.15 In 
regressions (1) and (3), that do not include the share of value added from agriculture, higher 
GDP per capita is associated with higher public spending on education. Considering the 
importance of the share of value added by agriculture, it is negatively and significantly related 
to education expenditures and renders the coefficient on GDP insignificant (regressions (2) and 
(4)). Both specifications, (1) and (2), explain approximately the same amount of the variation 
in public spending on education, namely 25%. 
3.3.1.2 Extension 
The extended model, also estimated by OLS, is the following: 
 = 	 + 	 +  +  +     (eq. 2) 
where the inclusion of , logged trade openness based on PPP, is the only 
modification of equation 1. For consistency reasons, now a PPP-based measure of GDP is used 
in the controls.16 The main results of regressions (5) and (6) remain unchanged in comparison 
to (3) and (4): the coefficient on democracy is still positive, very similar in size, but 
insignificant in both specifications. Moreover, the coefficient on the communist dummy is 
slightly reduced in both size and significance and the coefficient on GDP is not significant 
anymore. More importantly, the size of the population now appears to have a positive effect of 
about the same size as the original (negative) one. The coefficient on the share of value added 
from agriculture in regression (6) is no longer significant and its inclusion actually lowers the 
adjusted R²-value.  
The estimated effect of trade openness on public education spending is significant, positive 
and comparatively large.17 This confirms Hypothesis 2. Moreover, the inclusion of this variable 
increases the R²-value from 24% to 43%.18  
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 The authors relate the significant communist dummy to Lott’s (1999) findings that totalitarian regimes tend to 
use education for indoctrination and therefore spend more on it.  
16
 The use of unadjusted GDP does not alter the results significantly (see Table A.1, (3) and (4)). 
17
 Note that this is partly due to the transformation: if trade openness is not logarithmized, it remains significant 
but the coefficient decreases considerably: 0.021 instead of 1.476 (see Table 1, (5) and Table A.1, (5)). 
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3.3.1.3 Robustness checks 
A general drawback of models that use data averaged over time is the loss of dynamic 
information, in this particular case 30 years. With respect to robustness of the results and the 
fulfillment of the OLS assumptions, all models show similar characteristics: Ramsey’s RESET 
test (1969) indicates that the linear functional form is correctly specified. Multicollinearity is 
not a problem either. Also, since there is no time dimension in the data, serial correlation is not 
an issue. Yet, the Breusch-Pagan LM test (1980) shows heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 
Since the reason for this heteroskedasticity cannot be modeled here, robust standard errors 
should be applied.19 In addition, the Jarque-Bera test (1980) indicates that the errors are not 
normally distributed in all cases. This does not invalidate OLS, but implies that the estimator is 
not asymptotically efficient. In sum, the use of OLS can be justified when heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors are employed. Concerning outliers, the jackknife test indicates robust 
results. 
While the main conclusion of Mulligan et al. (2004), democracies and non-democracies do 
not differ significantly in public education spending, is not altered by the inclusion of trade 
openness, the explanation of cross-country differences in education spending changes: the 
negative effect of population size has been put into question, as well as the importance of 
British legal origin, GDP and the share of value added from agriculture. Trade openness, in 
both specifications, seems to contribute significantly to explaining cross-country public 
spending patterns. Therefore, it can be argued that the original model suffered from omitted 
variable bias. Note that this might still be the case for the extend model as well. 
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 When trade openness is not adjusted for PPP, it also appears to be significant in both specifications, but the 
increase in the adjusted R²-value is substantially smaller: 33% instead of 43% with the PPP-adjusted measure (see 
Table A.1 (1) and (2)). 
19
 This is not done in the original paper but it does not alter the main findings and trade openness remains 
significant at 1%. 
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Table 1: Replication and extension of Mulligan et al. (2004) 
 ORIGINAL RESULTS  REPLICATION  EXTENSION 
         
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
Democracy index 0.46 0.42  0.46 0.42  0.478 0.446 
 (0.53) (0.52)  (0.53) (0.52)  (0.452) (0.455) 
         
Communist dummy 1.21*** 1.09**  1.21*** 1.09**  1.018** 0.984** 
 (0.45) (0.45)  (0.46) (0.45)  (0.399) (0.409) 
         
British legal origin 0.52* 0.53*  0.52* 0.53*  0.152 0.043 
 (0.30) (0.31)  (0.30) (0.31)  (0.270) (0.279) 
         
% population >65 0.04 0.07  0.04 0.07  -0.028 -0.023 
 (0.06) (0.06)  (0.06) (0.06)  (0.053) (0.055) 
         
Log(population)/10 -2.34*** -2.28***  -2.34*** -2.28***  2.325** 2.211** 
 (0.84) (0.86)  (0.85) (0.86)  (0.993) (1.069) 
         
Log real GDP per capita 0.46** -0.06  0.46** -0.06  0.203 0.161 
 (0.19) (0.29)  (0.19) (0.29)  (0.140) (0.220) 
         
Share of value added from agriculture  -3.38**   -3.38**   -0.074 
  (1.60)   (1.60)   (1.543) 
         
Log trade openness (PPP)       1.476*** 1.499*** 
       (0.236) (0.265) 
         
         
N/Countries 114 110  114 110  112 109 
Adjusted R² 0.24 0.25  0.24 0.25  0.43 0.42 
Coefficients and SE in (.), significance levels: 0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01*** Dependent variable: total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP.  
All regressions include a constant (not presented), OLS estimates with normal SE. 
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3.3.2 Time-series cross-sectional analysis of an African sample: Stasavage (2005) 
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, Stasavage (2005) assumes that if politicians need to respond 
to the majority of citizens in order to stay in office, governments spend more on education. He 
tests this in a sample of 44 African countries from 1980 to 1996. In his TSCS analysis, 
Stasavage (2005) uses pooled OLS with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE, eq. 3) and a 
fixed effects (FE) model that eliminates unobserved time-invariant country specific influences 
(eq. 4): 
 = 	 +	 + 	 +      (eq. 3) 
 = 	 +	 + 	 +  +     (eq. 4) 
where 	 is a constant,  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if candidates 
from more than one party competed for the executive elections,  is a vector of control 
variables,  are country specific effects and  is the error term. The controls include a 
dummy for election years, GDP per capita, total aid as a percentage of GDP, the share of rural 
population and the share of the population younger than 15. 
The results are presented in Table 2. The coefficient on the multiparty competition dummy 
is positive and statistically significant at 5% in both his specifications (1) and (2), but the FE 
estimate is smaller in magnitude. Both estimates confirm Stasavage’s (2005) hypothesis as well 
as Hypothesis 1.20 Furthermore, higher GDP per capita is also associated with higher public 
spending on education. The effect (sign and significance level) of the other variables depends 
on the specification; only the election year dummy does not appear to be significant at all. This 
hints at the possibility that cross-country and within-country determinants of public education 
spending might differ or that the estimation techniques pick up different effects. 
3.3.2.1 Replication 
For both the election year dummy and the GDP per capita measure, the sources are unclear 
which makes close replication more complicated. Moreover, despite using the same sources for 
the remaining variables, the replication dataset is smaller which causes the number of 
observations in the replication to be only half of the original ones. In addition, some data points 
had to be removed from the dataset since these outliers significantly influenced the results. The 
number of countries included in the regressions thus decreases from 44 to 29. As this reduces 
the accuracy of the replication, the time period is tentatively expanded by 10 years: in addition 
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 As a robustness check, he runs the same regression using public spending on education as a percentage of total 
government spending (instead of % GDP). This also yields positive and significant coefficients on multiparty 
competition that are even larger in magnitude. In order to be able to compare the results of the replication and 
extension with the other papers, this additional measure is not used here. 
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to 1980-1995, the models are also replicated for the period of 1970-1995. The inclusion of 
more recent data was not possible due to availability of the multiparty variable, but the 
extended period increases the number of observations by nearly 50%. The additional estimation 
results for the larger time period are presented in Table A.2 in the appendix. 
Regressions (3) and (4) in Table 2 are the replication of the original time period with OLS 
and FE respectively. As already noted, the number of observations is significantly lower which 
might affect the results.  
In the OLS estimation (3), the coefficient on the multiparty dummy is also positive and 
significant, but only at 10% instead of 1%. Nonetheless, it confirms Hypothesis 1. GDP per 
capita is significant as well, but has the opposite sign which is hard to explain on theoretical 
grounds. All other variables are not significant in the OLS estimation and the R²-value is 
noticeably lower in the replication (19% vs. 37%).  
The FE replication (4) is even farther from the original results, with a negative and 
insignificant coefficient on the multiparty dummy. The only significant variable is the share of 
rural population, but this coefficient has the opposite sign of the one in (1). Moreover, this 
specification has a very low within R²-value.21 Given that the replication mainly differs in the 
sample examined, one might suspect that Stasavage’s (2005) model is not entirely robust 
although he confirms his findings by enlarging the dataset with multiple data imputation.22 
3.3.2.2 Extension 
The original OLS and FE models (eq. 3 and 4, respectively) are extended as follows: 
 = 	 +	 +	 +  +   (eq. 5) 
 = 	 +	 +	 + 	 +  + . (eq. 6) 
As in the replication of Mulligan et al. (2004), only  is added to the models 
and the GDP variable is now PPP-adjusted.23 The replicated OLS results are not robust to the 
inclusion of trade openness (see Table 2, (6)). Multiparty competition is still significant, but its 
coefficient is smaller. Interestingly, various controls now turn out to be significant at the 1%-
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 The extension of the time period in Table A.2 does not yield closer replication results and the R²-value 
diminishes further. That is why the extension of Stasavage’s (2005) model only includes the years 1980-1995. 
Nonetheless, the extension of the time period underlines the fragility of the original results. 
22
 More specifically, he not only enlarges the dataset but also uses a slightly different specification by including a 
one-year lag of the dependent variable. Signs and significance of the variables included remain basically the same, 
but the size of the coefficients varies. 
23
 While sign, size and significance of the trade openness measure remain unchanged, GDP interestingly switches 
its sign when not adjusted for PPP (compare Table 2 (6) and Table A.2 (6)). The effects of other controls are not 
robust to the different accounting methods either. While this could be a particularity of the African sample, further 
investigation might yield more insights. 
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level (GDP, share of rural population, share of population below the age of 15) and the GDP 
coefficient has switched its sign. The coefficient on trade openness is significant at the 1%-
level, positive and comparatively large in size, thus confirming Hypothesis 2. Again, the 
inclusion of trade openness adds noticeably to the fit of the model since the R²-value more than 
doubles.  
The extended FE results (7) remain rather similar to the replicated results (4). Multiparty 
competition is not significant and the share of the population younger than 15 is negatively 
related to education spending. Trade openness is not significant and its inclusion does not 
improve the statistical fit of the model. 
3.3.2.3 Robustness Checks 
The general impression obtained from the replicated and extended results is that the 
original models are neither robust to variations in the sample nor to a change in the estimation 
technique. In addition to these issues, a statistical concern can be raised: apart from 
autocorrelation (Avelino et al., 2005), TSCS data have an increased chance of unobserved 
heterogeneity as well as spatial cross-sectional dependence (Breitung and Pesaran, 2005),  
Beck and Katz (1995) discuss the shortcomings of OLS in TSCS panel data in depth and 
show that the estimates of the coefficients might remain consistent but are inefficient. 
Therefore, they advocate the use of PCSE that take into account the contemporaneous 
correlation in the errors as well as heteroskedasticity. These PCSE have been used by 
Stasavage as well as in both the replication and the extension. Yet, it should be noted that OLS 
with PCSE does not take care of autocorrelation. Many authors thus try to address 
autocorrelation by including a lagged dependent variable. Yet, as e.g. Achen (2000) shows, this 
method can result in underestimation of the importance of other variables, especially if they 
vary little over time. Therefore, following Rudra and Haggard (2001) and Avelino et al. (2005), 
the Prais-Winsten (PW) estimator is used instead of including a lag, in order to take care of 
autocorrelation. This estimator assumes a first order autocorrelation process with the 
coefficient of this process being the same across all panels and it transforms all observations to 
generate homoscedastic non-autocorrelated errors (Verbeek, 2008: 107-108).  
First, equation 3 is estimated using PW (regression (5), Table 2). The results differ from 
the OLS regression (3) insofar as the multiparty dummy is not significant and some signs of the 
controls are reversed. The coefficient on GDP remains negative and significant.  
With respect to the inclusion of trade openness, the PW estimation of equation 5, 
regression (8), is slightly different from the OLS extension (6): the coefficient on trade 
openness is still significant and relatively large in size, yet multiparty competition and the share 
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of people younger than 15 are not significant. As in the OLS regressions (3) and (6), the 
increase in the R²-value due to the inclusion of trade openness can also be found in the PW 
estimations (5) and (8).24 
Overall, the results of the PW estimations can be interpreted as evidence that the results 
might suffer from autocorrelation and that more testing is needed in order to determine the 
appropriate model and estimation technique. This stands in contrasts to the robustness checks 
conducted by Stasavage (2005) that do not indicate problems of autocorrelation in his sample. 
The change in the controls due to the inclusion of trade openness might also be caused by 
omitted variables, which is discussed in section 3.4.2. 
In contrast to OLS and PW, the FE models have the advantage that they take care of all 
time-invariant heterogeneity and thus reduce the risk of omitted variables. The Hausman test 
(1978) clearly confirms the choice of FE over a random effects model. Wooldridge’s test 
(2002) shows autocorrelation in the errors for all models except the one including trade 
openness adjusted for PPP. Since heteroskedasticity is also present within the panels and 
cannot be modeled here, robust and clustered standard errors should be used. With these 
standard errors, all estimated coefficients are insignificant, which questions the validity of the 
model.25 Moreover, the errors are not normally distributed with the implications already 
discussed above. 
The extension of Stasavage (2005) yields the same conclusion as the one of Mulligan et al. 
(2004): Hypothesis 1 is not confirmed since the sign and significance of democracy vary with 
the specification, whereas Hypothesis 2, a positive effect of globalization, is sustained in cross-
country analyses. This holds true for a variety of additional specifications presented in Table 
A.2. With respect to within-county variations, trade openness does not seem to have any effect, 
except for the case in which trade openness is not logarithmized (Table A.2 (10)). A tentative 
explanation for this is given in section 3.4.3.  
Overall and in contrast to Mulligan et al. (2004), Stasavage (2005) appears less robust to 
variations in both sample and models, which might also be due to statistical shortcomings. 
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 Note that the R²-values of the PW and OLS estimation cannot be compared since the former is derived from the 
final regression with transformed dependent and independent variables whereas the OLS R² is based on an 
estimation using untransformed variables (Wooldridge, 2009: 422). 
25
 Note that Stasavage (2005) does not specify what kind of standard errors he uses in the FE regressions. 
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Table 2: Replication and extension of Stasavage (2005) 
 ORIGINAL RESULTS  REPLICATION  EXTENSION 
 OLS FE  OLS FE PW  OLS FE PW 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
           
Multiparty competition 1.10*** 0.358**  0.802** -0.420 0.217  0.486* -0.440 0.203 
 (0.21) (0.168)  (0.401) (0.332) (0.355)  (0.291) (0.350) (0.270) 
           
Election year -0.085 0.065  0.117 0.193 -0.094  0.170 0.203 -0.084 
 (0.388) (0.206)  (0.507) (0.339) (0.232)  (0.451) (0.349) (0.221) 
           
Log GDP per capita 1.49*** 0.591***  -0.368*** -0.618 -0.358***  0.736*** -0.398 0.772*** 
 (0.12) (0.214)  (0.109) (1.053) (0.123)  (0.268) (1.077) (0.279) 
           
Aid in % GDP -0.0004 -0.021**  -0.023 -0.023 -0.017  -0.011 -0.026 -0.006 
 (0.007) (0.009)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.014)  (0.019) (0.019) (0.015) 
           
% rural population  0.035*** 0.012  0.006 -0.083* -0.007  0.063*** -0.078* 0.054** 
 (0.010) (0.015)  (0.012) (0.044) (0.014)  (0.012) (0.045) (0.021) 
           
% population <15 0.049 -0.272***  0.049 -0.202 0.027  0.096*** -0.223 0.066 
 (0.039) (0.077)  (0.033) (0.160) (0.052)  (0.034) (0.166) (0.052) 
           
Log trade openness         1.969*** -0.500 1.751*** 
(PPP)        (0.273) (0.518) (0.291) 
           
Constant -10.32*** 11.84***  5.432** 26.44* 7.507***  -16.30*** 24.98* -13.77*** 
 (1.84) (3.70)  (2.138) (15.49) (2.740)  (2.030) (12.83) (3.059) 
           
N 365 365  176 176 176  173 173 173 
Countries 44 44  29 29 29  29 29 29 
R² 0.37   0.19 0.67 0.47  0.40 0.67 0.56 
Within R²  0.26   0.08    0.08  
Coefficients and SE in (.), significance levels: 0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01*** Dependent variable: total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP. PCSE for OLS and PW 
estimates, normal SE for FE. Within country R²-values for FE models from Stata’s xtreg command, adjusted R² for FE from areg. Standard R² for OLS and PW (this is the 
norm for OLS estimates with PCSE and PW).
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3.3.3 Time-series cross-sectional analysis of a global sample: Ansell (2008) 
Ansell’s (2008) is the only one of the three replicated models that includes a measure of 
trade openness.26 His theory leads to several hypotheses, inter alia, “the expansion of 
democracy increases public education spending” and “increased integration with the global 
economy will lead to increased education spending in both democracies and autocracies” (pp. 
249, 296), consistent with Hypothesis 1 and 2. His data encompass the years 1960-2000 and 
113 countries. Like Stasavage (2005), Ansell (2008) also employs OLS with PCSE (eq. 7) and 
FE estimation (eq. 8), but uses a dynamic specification: 
 = 	 +  + 	 +  +  +   +	 
           (eq. 7) 
 = 	 +  + 	 +  +  +  +	  
           (eq. 8) 
where both models include a one-year lag of the dependent variable, 		is the 
POLITY IV score,  is the logged sum of exports and imports over GDP,  is a 
vector of controls,   are regional dummies,  represents country specific effects and  
is the error term. The controls include the fraction of young people, GDP and its square, a 
measure of total population and total government expenditures net of education spending as 
well as a linear time trend.  
The original regressions (1) and (2) in Table 3 indicate a significant and positive effect of 
both democracy and trade openness, which is consistent with Ansell’s (2008) hypotheses and 
the ones derived from the literature. Sign and significance of the coefficients on GDP and its 
square vary by specification, the other controls are consistently insignificant, except for the 
time trend which appears to have a negative effect. 
3.3.3.1 Replication 
Again, replication problems arise due to the data. Despite the use of the same source, data 
for the dependent variable covers 178 states with an average of 10.7 observations for each 
state, instead of 113 countries with an average of 15.4 observations. Nonetheless, mean and 
standard deviation are quite similar (4.3 vs. 4.2 and 2.1 vs. 1.9, respectively). Moreover, doubts 
remain concerning the exact construction of government consumption excluding education as 
well as the source and measurement method of GDP. Since outliers do not significantly 
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 Apart from (exports+imports)/GDP, Ansell (2008) also uses a measure of openness constructed by Hiscox and 
Kastner (2006) that shows the country’s deviance from its optimal amount of trade (predicted by a gravity model). 
Since higher values of the index imply higher levels of protectionism, estimation results are expected to have the 
opposite sign. Findings from this index are consistent with the conventional variable and are not replicated here. 
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influence the results, all observations are kept to leave the sample as large as possible. In the 
end, the replication dataset includes more countries but fewer observations (126 vs. 113 and 
1161 vs. 1501) which might be a reason for differing replication results.  
In the replication, the coefficient on democracy is only significant at the 10% level in the 
OLS estimation (3) and is smaller in magnitude in both regressions (3) and (4). Evidence for 
Hypothesis 1 is therefore rather weak. The coefficient on trade openness (not adjusted for PPP) 
is not significant in either estimation which differs from the original results and contradicts 
Hypothesis 2.27 Interestingly, the R²-values are all slightly higher in the replication which could 
be due to the relatively large and significant effect of the lagged dependent variable.  
With regard to replication, the original time span yields the closest results and is therefore 
used in the extension. The results for an increased time span are presented in Table A.3. 
Overall, the replication results suggest that the conventional trade openness measure as well as 
the polity score and thus Ansell’s (2008) models are not robust in a different sample. 
3.3.3.2 Extension 
In the extension, the trade openness variables are substituted by the PPP-based measure 
which yields the following models: 
 = 	 +  + 	 +  +  +   +	 
           (eq. 9) 
 = 	 +  + 	 +  +  +  +	.  
           (eq. 10) 
Using the PPP-based measures of trade openness and GDP,28 the sample is reduced from 
1161 to 889 observations and from 126 to 125 countries. Trade openness is now significant in 
the OLS regression (6) in Table 3. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 as well as the original 
findings. The other coefficients, including the one on democracy, are insignificant with the 
exception of government expenditures in the FE model. As in the extension of Stasavage 
(2005), trade openness is not significant in the FE model. Moreover, while the R²-value 
remains unchanged in the OLS estimation, it decreases in the FE model from 66% to 62% for 
the within explanatory power and stays the same for the overall adjusted R². 
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 Since the regional dummies do not turn out to be significant, they are dropped in Table A.3, (1). Now, neither 
democracy nor trade is significant when estimated by OLS. Again, the sample is enlarged to include 12 more years 
(1960-2012) to check whether the replication results are robust A.3, (3) and (4). The sample now includes 141 
countries and 2016 observations. Neither of the two main independent variables turns out to be significant but the 
size of the coefficients on the lag is even larger which hints at a unit root process in the dependent variable. 
28
 The use of unadjusted GDP does not significantly alter the results (see Table A.3, (6-8)). 
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3.3.3.3 Robustness checks 
As already discussed in the robustness checks of Stasavage (2005), autocorrelation might 
be a problem, thus justifying the inclusion of the lag. On the other hand, this lag might lead to 
the underestimation of other variables (Achen, 2000).29 Therefore, the PW estimation technique 
is used again, without a lag (see Table 3, regression (5) and (8)). Using the conventional 
measure of trade openness, both coefficients on democracy and trade openness are positive, 
larger in size than in the original results and also statistically significant (see regression (5)). 
This is in line with the original results, both hypotheses and Achen’s (2000) concern. With the 
PPP-based measure, both coefficients increase in size and remain significant at the 1%-level 
(see regression (8)). Again, the R²-value increases when the PPP-based measure is used (from 
51% to 56%).  
Regarding the robustness of the FE model, the findings are similar to the ones in Stasavage 
(2005): the Hausman test (1978) favors the FE model, heteroskedasticity is present within the 
panels and the errors are not normally distributed. Moreover, all FE models suffer from serial 
correlation, as indicated by Wooldridge’s test (2002). Therefore, robust and clustered standard 
errors have been used, both by Ansell (2008) and in this paper. Nonetheless, the FE estimator is 
inconsistent for finite time periods in this specification due to the correlation of the lagged 
dependent variable and the error term (Verbeek, 2008: 378).  
These results suggest that the PPP-based measure of trade openness more robust than the 
unadjusted one in cross-sectional analyses. Furthermore, the use of the PW technique might be 
a good alternative to a lagged dependent variable when accounting for autocorrelation. Yet, 
trade openness, measured in either way, does not appear to have a significant within-county 
effect on public education spending except for when trade openness is not logarithmized. This 
is consistent with the replication and extension results of Stasavage (2005). 
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 Yet, it is hard to explain why Ansell’s (2008) original estimations do not seem to suffer from this problem. 
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Table 3: Replication and extension of Ansell (2008) 
 ORIGINAL RESULTS  REPLICATION  EXTENSION (PPP MEASURES) 
 OLS FE  OLS FE PW  OLS FE PW 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged DV 0.792*** 0.608***  0.910*** 0.773***   0.898*** 0.750***  
 (0.034) (0.018)  (0.022) (0.044)   (0.026) (0.056)  
Polity IV score 0.016*** 0.012**  0.007* 0.007 0.030***  0.008 -0.002 0.043*** 
 (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004) (0.005) (0.009)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) 
Log trade  0.282*** 0.232***  0.039 0.110 0.607***  0.155*** 0.159 1.078*** 
openness (0.061) (0.089)  (0.045) (0.110) (0.144)  (0.006) (0.132) (0.250) 
% population <15 0.005 -0.015  0.003 -0.002 -0.008  0.000 -0.012 -0.007 
 (0.006) (0.011)  (0.004) (0.011) (0.015)  (0.004) (0.015) (0.013) 
Log GDP -0.390 2.180***  0.191 0.733* -0.099  0.073 0.381 -0.459 
 (0.251) (0.833)  (0.215) (0.389) (0.660)  (0.168) (0.452) (0.416) 
(Log GDP)² 0.010* -0.041**  -0.003 -0.012 0.008  -0.004 -0.023 0.017 
 (0.005) (0.017)  (0.004) (0.008) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.017) (0.017) 
Log population -0.058 -0.012  -0.043* -0.151 -0.313***  0.044 0.344 0.124 
 (0.045) (0.225)  (0.024) (0.262) (0.071)  (0.039) (0.389) (0.196) 
Government exp. 0.003 0.003  0.005 0.018** 0.034***  0.001 0.025** 0.025* 
 (0.006) (0.006)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.013)  (0.007) (0.012) (0.013) 
Year -0.019*** -0.016***  -0.004 -0.011 -0.012  -0.003 -0.002 -0.030** 
 (0.004) (0.006)  (0.002) (0.007) (0.007)  (0.004) (0.013) (0.01) 
Constant 41.43*** 5.829  5.145 14.22 29.01  4.365 -2.506 61.52*** 
 (7.494) (14.297)  (5.916) (13.50) (17.04)  (7.492) (22.97) (23.33) 
N 1501 1501  1161 1161 1578  889 889 1192 
Countries 113 113  126 126 140  125 125 137 
R² 0.83   0.90 0.91 0.51  0.90 0.91 0.56 
Within R²  0.50   0.66    0.62  
Coefficients and SE in (.), significance levels: 0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01*** Dependent variable: total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP. OLS  
and PW with PCSE, FE with robust SE. OLS and PW with regional dummies, omitted region is North America. Within country R²-values for FE models  
from Stata’s xtreg command, adjusted R² from areg. Standard R² for OLS and PW.
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3.4 Discussion 
Replication of (time-series) cross-sectional estimations is often difficult due to the 
diversity of data sources and the variation in the definition of variables. Without the original 
dataset, close replication is nearly impossible. Nonetheless, some specifications in this paper 
yield relatively close results with respect to the main variables. Therefore, it is valid to compare 
the extended results to the original articles.  
The three replicated models use very different samples, independent variables, controls 
and estimation techniques: Mulligan et al. (2004) use averages of all variables for 112 countries 
and therefore only capture cross-country differences which they analyze using OLS. Stasavage 
(2005) restricts his sample to African countries, estimating both cross- and within-country 
variations in the OLS and FE model respectively. Ansell (2008) examines the largest sample 
and uses the same estimation techniques as Stasavage (2005), but includes a lagged dependent 
variable.  
Despite these differences and in contrast to other variables, trade openness, when adjusted 
for PPP, appears to have a consistent, positive and relatively large effect on government 
spending on education in cross-country comparisons and adds to the statistical fit of the 
respective model. This effect appears to be more robust than the one from the conventional 
trade openness measure (see Table 3), that does not take into account PPP and therefore 
overstates the importance of trade relative to GDP in developing countries. Nonetheless, the 
robustness of log trade openness has to be questioned, since it is not significant in any FE 
model. Potential reasons for these systematic differences are discussed below in section 3.4.3. 
Overall, the evidence for Hypothesis 2 found is inconclusive. 
The second important variable that is very popular in the literature and captures the main 
supply side mechanism, regime type, does not seem to be robust, either: in both the replication 
and extension of Mulligan et al. (2004), the average POLITY IV score is not significant. 
Moreover, when dropping regime type from the models, all other estimates remain roughly the 
same and the adjusted R²-value does not change. Empirically, this implies that democracy 
could be omitted, but this would still need a theoretical foundation. In Stasavage (2005), sign 
and robustness of democracy, defined as multiparty competition, depend on the specification. 
Only the OLS results show a significant and positive effect. In addition, in the cross-country 
analyses, the omission of multiparty does not cause a decrease in the R²-value, but it does so in 
the FE model, which is counter-intuitive. In the replication and extension of Ansell (2008), 
democracy, measured by the Polity score, is mostly positive and significant in the OLS and PW 
specifications, while it is insignificant in the FE models. The omission of democracy does not 
noticeably change the R²-value of any model. In contrast to many previous studies that find a 
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positive effect, the results presented here suggest that there is no clear effect of democracy on 
education spending that holds true for different samples and specifications. The evidence for 
Hypothesis 1 in this paper is therefore mixed.  
In sum, these inconclusive results clearly show that the robustness of empirical models, 
that try to reveal the determinants of public education spending, is often questionable. Do the 
effects of trade openness and/or democracy matter across countries but not within? If so, why? 
More research is needed to answer these questions. Ideally, this research would start by 
building a more comprehensive supply and demand model of government spending on 
education which will be able to guide empirical estimations. 
Since this paper only replicates and extends previous models, it is necessarily subject to 
the same (potential) problems as the original articles. In the following, concerns with regard to 
data and measurement problems, econometric issues and the interpretation of empirical results 
are addressed. 
3.4.1 Data and measurement issues 
Two important concerns are briefly discussed below: data availability and measurement 
problems. 
One frequent issue of cross-sectional analyses including developing countries is data 
availability. The tables B.2-B.4 in the appendix show the summary statistics for the replicated 
models. It can be seen that, while country characteristics such as the structure of the population 
are well covered by the data, variables concerning government spending in general, on 
education or on aid, have fewer observations. If countries that trade less or are less democratic 
tend to have less complete statistics of their government expenditures, this can lead to an 
upward bias of the estimated effects of trade openness and democracy on education spending.  
Moreover, replication and extension results point toward the problem that many empirical 
models are not robust to changes in the sample. Since close replication combined with 
statistical robustness checks would increase transparency of empirical research, more 
accessible data would be desirable: 
“Big data promises big progress. But large datasets also make replication impossible without the 
author’s cooperation. And the incentive for authors to cooperate is, at best, mixed. It is therefore the 
responsibility of editorial boards and the directors of organizations like the NBER to make open 
access obligatory.” (Eichengreen, 2013) 
When data is available, variables might be measured with error. If these errors are random, 
they only increase the noise, but if the errors occur systematically, e.g. because non-
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democracies want to make a good impression on the international stage and therefore overstate 
their education expenditures, the regression results will be biased.  
Moreover, different ways of accounting for the dependent variable (and most of the 
regressors) exist. Many studies use education spending as a percentage of GDP, which shows 
the global allocation of the resources of a particular country. Yet, as Rudra and Haggard (2001) 
argue, this conventional measure does not show how governments assign priorities and how 
they distribute the resources they actually control. This would be more accurately reflected in 
government spending as a percentage of total government expenditures. Therefore, the research 
question has to be precisely formulated, as it ultimately determines which measure is best to 
use. 
Furthermore, all three models examine education spending, democracy (and trade 
openness) in levels. While this renders results comparable to the majority of the literature, it 
can reasonably be argued that both changes in the level of trade openness and democracy can 
lead to a shift in preferences for education spending. For a more encompassing understanding 
of public education spending, the effect of the respective changes should also be investigated, 
as for instance in Avelino et al. (2005).30 Unfortunately, this is beyond the scope of this paper. 
3.4.2 Econometric issues 
In addition to data and measurement issues, the replicated models might suffer from 
econometric shortcomings, most importantly specification problems and violations of OLS 
assumptions. The robustness checks in the respective sections have shown that although many 
issues have been taken care of, some concerns remain. In what follows, problems common to 
most models, namely omitted variables, unit root processes in the variables as well as 
endogeneity, are briefly outlined.  
The literature suggests a large variation of potentially important variables that could be 
included in the analysis of education spending, such that the somewhat arbitrary inclusion of 
independent variables and controls might lead to omitted variable bias, the direction of which is 
impossible to predict. In fact, the importance of the regional dummies in Ansell (2008) 
suggests that region-specific effects on education spending are not entirely caught by the 
independent variables.31  
In many studies, the inclusion of control variables “[…] with an emphasis on those used in 
prior studies of policy determination […]” (Mulligan et al., 2004: 55) might offer a certain 
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 They employ an error correction model and find that both trade openness (PPP) and democracy are positive and 
significant but changes in those variables do not appear to be significant. 
31
 Even though the dummies do not turn out significant in the replication, an omission of the dummies leads to 
altered results (see Table A.3 (1)). In all other specifications, at least some of coefficients on the dummies are 
significant. 
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degree of comparability to previous research but lacks theoretical reasoning. In general, some 
controls are included because theories of other authors argue to do so, yet the choice of which 
specific set of control variables to include often appears to be arbitrary. Usually, only the 
inclusion of controls, if anything, is justified, but never the exclusion of particular variables. 
For instance, Ansell (2008) explains why he uses the share of persons younger than 15, but he 
does not mention the “omission” of the share of rural population, although both measures are 
not explicitly mentioned in his theoretical framework and are common control variables. 
Furthermore, Ansell’s (2008) model hints at another potential problem: the fragility of the 
controls and the large coefficients on the lag hint at the possibility that some variables might 
contain a unit root, at least in the case of government education spending. The Fisher type unit 
root rest shows inconclusive results for the regressand, depending on the choice of the test 
statistic. Since the alternative hypothesis is that at least one panel is stationary, even a rejection 
of the null hypothesis would imply that several panels may contain a unit root which further 
complicates the analysis. Theoretically, all variables should be tested for a unit root to make 
sure that they are all integrated of the same order. Otherwise, the regressions would be 
spurious. In addition, cointegration tests should help determining the correct model for TSCS 
data, thus also for Stasavage (2005). 
Lastly, a potential issue common to all models, and thus not yet discussed in the individual 
robustness checks, is endogeneity. For many independent variables, it is hard to argue that 
there is no feedback effect. With respect to regime type, for instance, increased education 
spending can result in better education of democratic citizens and thus positively influences 
democratization (Barro, 1999) or it might help maintain totalitarian regimes (Lott, 1999). 
Moreover, if increased education results in better education of women, birth rates may be 
lowered (Drèze and Murthi, 2001), such that in the long run, both total population and the share 
of young people are going to decrease whereas the share of older people is going to rise. 
Furthermore, if increased education spending also advances technology and innovation 
(Varsakelis, 2006), it is likely to decrease the share of value added from agriculture in the long 
run and might also contribute to specialization and increased trading. Therefore, education 
spending is likely to have a variety of long run effects on the independent variables. Since 
those are mostly medium and long run effects, endogeneity does not seem to be the most 
important concern.32 This conclusion is consistent with Ansell’s (2008) estimations that use 
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 It could be argued that Mulligan et al. (2004) might capture some endogeneity in their estimates because they 
use averages of their variables. Yet, their independent variables are averaged across 1960-1990 and the dependent 
variable only across 1980-1990 which reduces the risk of endogeneity. 
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lags as instrumental variables and yield the same results with respect to democracy and trade 
openness.33  
In the last decade, the research on panel data robustness checks and suitable estimators has 
greatly enhanced.34 As the above discussion has shown, the employed cross-sectional and 
within-country estimators are suboptimal. If more extensive and complete data were available, 
more sophisticated estimators could be used in the analysis of education spending. That is why 
imputations techniques might be interesting to enlarge datasets. Yet in this paper, missing data 
is dealt with by listwise deletion, as in the baseline regressions of the original models. 
3.4.3 Interpretation 
The main results, inconclusive evidence for both hypotheses, have already been discussed 
above. Concerning trade openness, it is noteworthy that its effect, whether measured in PPP or 
not, appears to be consistently significant in cross-country comparisons only: countries that 
trade more tend to spend more on public education. But what happens if a country opens up to 
international trade? According to the estimates, not much. Coefficients on log trade openness in 
FE models have different (mainly positive) signs in replications and extensions, but remain 
insignificant in all replications and extensions.35 
Why does trade openness seem to matter in cross-country comparisons but not within 
countries? While the theoretical literature does not offer an explanation, statistical issues might 
play a role. Two tentative rationales, omitted variables and low within-country variance, are 
presented in the following. 
In light of manifold potential determinants of public education spending, the trade 
openness variable might capture important omitted influences that vary across countries but not 
over time, while trade openness is not a significant determinant itself. In this case, the omitted 
influences captured by trade openness are absorbed in the FE models, rendering trade openness 
insignificant. The suspiciously large increase in the R²-values when trade openness is included 
might also hint at the possibility that several effects are captured instead of just the one of trade 
openness. In Mulligan et al. (2004), for instance, the inclusion of trade openness raises the R²-
value from 24% to 43%, whereas the inclusion of the share of value added from agriculture 
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 The variations in the controls could be due to, inter alia, omitted variables or endogeneity. A final conclusion 
with respect to the results of the IV regressions can thus not be reached. 
34
 For an overview of recent developments in tests of both the first and the second generation (assumption of 
cross-sectional independence and dependence, respectively) see Hurlin and Mignon (2006). 
35
 Note that in the original FE results, the coefficient on trade openness is positive and significant in Ansell (2008). 
All other authors cited in the literature review do not use FE and therefore do not allow further comparisons. 
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only adds one percentage point, although it appears to be highly significant.36 If this 
explanation was correct, the omitted variable(s) would be country-specific since the omission 
of regional dummies in Table A.3 (1) and (2) does not significantly alter the coefficient on 
trade openness.37  
Finally, this explanation leads to the important question of what omitted effects could be 
captured by trade openness in the cross-country comparisons. One potential factor could be 
institutional effects that are usually hard to observe and to account for, but as they are 
practically time-invariant, they can be controlled for in FE models. It can be argued that such 
effects would influence both trade openness and education spending: it is plausible that, (cet. 
par.), weak institutions lower trade since they imply higher uncertainty and costs for the trading 
partner. Weak institutions might also lower spending on education, e.g. in favor of corruption. 
As Mauro (1998) and Gupta et al. (2002) have shown, corruption decreases public spending for 
goods that are hard to target such as education. Therefore, institutional effects and their 
outcomes might be captured by trade openness which thus turns out to be significant in cross-
sectional studies. In addition to institutions, cultural effects might also play a role. Tentatively, 
a measure for institutional quality could be included in future empirical models. Yet, for more 
certainty, this issue should ideally be solved theoretically. 
Another rationale for the insignificance of trade openness for public education spending in 
the FE models might be its low within variance, since the FE estimator is inefficient when 
variables that vary little within the fixed units: „[... this] does not only imply low levels of 
significance, [but] point estimates are also unreliable“ (Plümper and Troeger, 2007: 127). 
When looking at Table B.3, it can be seen that both trade variables, regardless of PPP 
adjustment, have a comparatively low within-country variance in Stasavage’s (2005) sample; 
only the dummy variables and GDP have a lower variance. All these variable turn out to be 
insignificant in the FE estimations in Table 2 and Table A.2, whereas e.g. GDP is consistently 
significant in the cross-country specifications. The same picture emerges from Ansell’s (2008) 
models: together with the log of population, the two trade variables have the lowest within-
country variance (Table B.4). These three variables are never significant in the FE estimations. 
Yet, as the non-logarithmized trade variable shows, this problem does not seem to be due to the 
fact that trade openness does not carry enough information for a significant within-country 
estimate. Rather, the logarithmic transformation significantly reduces the within-country 
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 The other replicated authors do not vary their control variables which impedes further comparisons of increases 
in the R²-value. Since panel data models tend to have lower R²-values, the increase due to trade openness can 
indeed be evaluated as very large. 
37
 Nor do the estimates for the coefficients change much when the dummies are omitted in the other models 
(results are not reported here). 
31 
variance. Indeed, when trade openness is not log transformed, it is significant in FE models as 
well (Table A.2 (10) and A.3 (10)). In both cases, the estimated effect of trade openness is now 
negative, which is consistent with the findings of Rudra and Haggard (2001). Nonetheless, this 
leaves new questions for future research, since it contradicts Hypothesis 2. Also, it is hard to 
explain why in Stasavage’s (2005) sample, this FE model has a comparatively high R²-value, 
whereas the fit of the FE model does not improve in Ansell’s (2008) sample. Moreover, it is 
difficult to tell why the original results of Ansell (2008) do not suffer from this problem, 
although (unadjusted) log trade openness is used. In general, it is not clear, why some 
variables, e.g. GDP and trade openness, are log transformed but, for instance, aid in Stasavage 
(2005) and government expenditures in Ansell (2008) are not. In sum, the insignificant log 
trade openness coefficient in FE models might be a result of the log-transformation, but this is 
only a tentative explanation. 
Both the omitted variable and the low variance explanation seem to be supported by the 
R²-values that remain the same or even decrease after the inclusion of log trade openness in FE 
models (see Table 2, (4) and (7); Table 3, (4) and (7)). If trade openness captured time-
invariant country specific effects, it should not add to explaining the within country variance of 
education spending and if it had too few information, its inclusion should not matter either. 
Nonetheless, these two approaches to an explanation are only tentative and it should be kept in 
mind that previous empirical research has produced many different results. Therefore, it should 
be investigated whether this systematic difference between cross- and within-country estimates 
also holds for different models or whether it is a mere coincidence and a particularity of this 
paper.38 In case of confirmation, a more sophisticated and ideally theoretical explanation will 
be needed. 
Finally, with respect to a broader interpretation of the findings, it has to be kept in mind 
that the level of public education spending is only a formal part of education policy and might 
not be tightly associated with neither quality nor effectiveness of a country’s educational 
system. On the one hand, it has been shown that expenditure levels are a determinant of 
literacy, which in turn can be seen as a rough measure of the educational system’s effectiveness 
(Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003: 293). On the other one, not all studies find a positive 
relationship between government spending on education and educational attainment (e.g. Gupta 
et al., 2002). 
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 Since the statistical robustness checks show several problems, particularly for the FE models, it could be the 
case that the FE models are flawed and thus not reliable.  
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Moreover, different ways of accounting might lead to a misleading cross-country picture 
of spending data (Brown and Hunter, 2004), which cannot simply be interpreted as an indicator 
of a government’s commitment to education:  
“Expenditure levels can be quite distorted by patterns of ‘hidden’ rents, disguised as higher salaries 
or cushy jobs for regime supporters. A politically corrupt state that is capturing larger rents and 
distributing them to its supporters through inflated or unnecessary expenditures, for instance, may 
appear to be spending more on education than a politically efficient regime, but the level of actual 
services delivered to citizens will be much lower in the first than in the second case.” (Baum and 
Lake, 2003: 336) 
Therefore, additional measures (ideally without measurement error) are needed to examine 
quality and effectiveness of educational systems across countries. Yet, comparability of these 
aspects is even more difficult to achieve and suitable measures do not yet encompass equally 
large samples.39 Public education spending therefore remains a widely used proxy for 
education policy as a subset of social policy, which would be important to understand more in-
depth.  
Given potential omitted variables and variations in measurement (e.g. GDP vs. GDP per 
capita) in addition to econometric issues, it is not surprising that signs and significance of 
independent variables vary, making a coherent interpretation impossible. This has already been 
noticed elsewhere, e.g. by Plümper and Martin (2003: 40): “The interpretation of the […] 
regression results is, however, restricted by lack of a consistent theoretical model. As a 
consequence, we cannot claim to have found the ‘right’ model”. Until a consistent theory 
allows empirical estimation with external validity and thus offers reliable inference, the 
empirical results concerning public spending on education should be interpreted very carefully. 
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 For further discussion of measurement issues of quality see e.g. Hanushek and Wößmann (2007). 
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Da steh ich nun, ich armer Tor!/ Und bin so klug als wie zuvor;/ Heiße Magister, heiße Doktor 
gar/ Und ziehe schon an die zehen Jahr/ Herauf, herab und quer und krumm/ Meine Schüler an 
der Nase herum-/ Und sehe, daß wir nichts wissen können!40 Faust 
4 Conclusion 
So, what do we really know about the determinants of public spending on education? We 
know that much remains to be done, if the ultimate goal of research in the field of political 
economy is to understand and inform politics, e.g. how and under which circumstances an 
efficient educational system can be built and maintained. 
This paper provides anecdotal evidence that the lack of consistent theory can lead to rather 
arbitrary empirical models, often yielding results that are not robust to changes in the sample, 
the inclusion of additional variables or different measurement methods. Moreover, many 
models can be questioned on statistical grounds. 
Although trade openness, as the additional variable investigated here, adds significantly to 
the goodness of fit of most models, its positive and significant effect on public education 
spending appears to be consistent only across countries. Current theory is not able to explain 
this discrepancy between estimated cross-sectional and within-country effects of trade 
openness and the statistical explanations offered here are only tentative. The estimated effects 
of regime type are also mixed, despite of more consistent previous findings. These outcomes 
underline the need for a coherent theory of education spending that can guide empirical 
analysis. In addition, more transparency and data sharing is needed which will facilitate 
replications and robustness checks, which in turn can lead to empirical advancements. 
Moreover, the informative value of public spending on education is limited and only the 
consideration of different dependent variables, e.g. public education spending, enrollment rates 
and educational attainment can lead to a sophisticated picture of education policy. Here, it will 
be important to try synthesizing different branches of research and their results. 
Finally, interpretation of the results ought to be careful and “economists should match 
honesty about what their research says with honesty about the inherently provisional nature of 
what passes as evidence in their profession” (Rodrik, 2013). The same criticism obviously 
applies to all social scientists, especially because politicians and journalists often tend to 
overstate the importance of a particular finding: “One thing that experts know, and that non-
experts do not, is that they know less than non-experts think they do” (Basu, 2013).  
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 And here, poor fool! with all my lore/ I stand, no wiser than before:/ I’m Magister - yea, Doctor - hight,/ And 
straight or cross-wise, wrong or right,/ These ten years long, with many woes,/ I’ve led my scholars by the nose,-/ 
And see, that nothing can be known! 
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As has been demonstrated, results are seldom unambiguous, entirely robust and easy to 
explain. Therefore, caution concerning interpretation should prevail until a consistent theory 
permits empirical analysis with external validity – that is what we really know about the 
determinants of public spending on education so far. 
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Appendices 
A Additional output 
 
Table A.1: Additional output for Mulligan et al. (2004) 
 EXTENSION 
 Unadjusted trade (log) 
and GDP 
Trade (PPP and log),  
unadjusted GDP 
Trade (PPP, no log), 
GDP (PPP) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Democracy index 0.865* 0.816 0.525 0.481 0.472 0.367 
 (0.509) (0.512) (0.463) (0.462) (0.507) (0.506) 
       
Communist dummy 1.078** 1.029** 0.944** 0.894** 1.024** 0.852* 
 (0.428) (0.429) (0.400) (0.400) (0.453) (0.459) 
       
British legal origin 0.175 0.080 0.116 0.038 0.314 0.272 
 (0.296) (0.313) (0.271) (0.281) (0.304) (0.311) 
       
% population >65 0.038 0.046 -0.006 0.004 0.021 0.045 
 (0.057) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.059) (0.060) 
       
Log(population)/10 1.642 1.489 2.023* 1.835* -0.379 -0.810 
 (1.311) (1.353) (1.050) (1.062) (0.949) (0.980) 
       
Log real GDP per capita  0.171 -0.012 0.124 -0.036 0.281* -0.032 
 (0.196) (0.279) (0.180) (0.261) (0.157) (0.241) 
       
Share of value added from agriculture  -0.979  -0.919  -2.496 
  (1.672)  (1.483)  (1.645) 
       
Log trade openness 1.405*** 1.149*** 1.457*** 1.438*** 0.021*** 0.018** 
 (0.362) (0.403) (0.247) (0.260) (0.007) (0.007) 
       
N/Countries 112 109 111 108 112 109 
Adjusted R² 0.33 0.32 0.42 0.41 0.29 0.29 
Coefficients and SE in (.), significance levels: 0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01*** Dependent variable: total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP.  
All regressions include a constant (not presented), OLS estimates with normal SE.   
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Table A.2: Additional output for Stasavage (2005) 
 1970-1995 
REPLICATION 
 
1980-1995 EXTENSION 
    Unadjusted trade (log) and GDP Trade (PPP and log), unadjusted GDP Trade (PPP, no log), GDP(PPP) 
 OLS FE  OLS FE PW OLS FE PW OLS FE PW 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
             
Multiparty competition 0.932* -0.414  0.837** -0.427 0.312 0.366 -0.456 0.057 0.234 -0.405 0.011 
 (0.533) (0.575)  (0.344) (0.342) (0.316) (0.319) (0.351) (0.326) (0.286) (0.323) (0.235) 
             
Election year -0.210 -0.089  0.333 0.205 -0.038 0.206 0.204 -0.032 0.125 0.215 -0.098 
 (0.619) (0.583)  (0.470) (0.349) (0.254) (0.496) (0.349) (0.270) (0.416) (0.337) (0.202) 
             
Log GDP per capita -0.387** 0.958  -0.243*** -0.695 -0.260*** -0.147*** -0.590 -0.174** 1.212*** -0.018 1.11*** 
 (0.157) (1.187)  (0.085) (1.070) (0.100) (0.052) (1.069) (0.081) (0.221) (1.043) (0.288) 
             
Aid in % GDP -0.030 0.001  -0.052*** -0.025 -0.037*** -0.020 -0.027 -0.012 0.014 -0.030 0.000 
 (0.023) (0.032)  (0.014) (0.020) (0.014) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) 
             
% rural population  -0.040*** -0.062  0.033*** -0.085* 0.022 0.033*** -0.080* 0.022 0.054*** -0.069 0.047** 
 (0.015) (0.051)  (0.010) (0.046) (0.014) (0.011) (0.045) (0.017) (0.012) (0.044) (0.022) 
             
% population <15 0.109** -0.505**  0.106*** -0.195 0.070 0.051 -0.232 0.026 0.084*** -0.256 0.044 
 (0.049) (0.202)  (0.031) (0.164) (0.045) (0.039) (0.167) (0.049) (0.031) (0.156) (0.054) 
             
Trade openness     1.907*** 0.153 1.797*** 1.630*** -0.498 1.504*** 0.045*** -0.038*** 0.067*** 
    (0.247) (0.591) (0.306) (0.261) (0.518) (0.228) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) 
             
Constant 6.71*** 22.28  -8.019*** 26.57* -4.838* -4.047 29.05* -1.355 -13.82*** 22.65* -10.21*** 
 (2.46) (18.32)  (2.022) (15.79) (2.523) (2.671) (16.17) (2.798) (1.800) (11.82) (3.104) 
             
N 264 264  174 174 174 173 173 173 175 175 177 
countries 30 30  29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R² 0.11 0.35  0.38 0.67 0.55 0.37 0.73 0.52 0.38 0.75 0.54 
Within R²  0.06   0.08   0.08   0.14  
Coefficients and SE in (.), significance levels: 0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01*** Dependent variable: total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP. PCSE for OLS and PW estimates, 
normal SE for FE. Within country R²-values for FE models from Stata’s xtreg command, adjusted R² from areg. Standard R² for OLS and PW.  
41 
Table A.3: Additional output for Ansell (2008) 
 REPLICATION   EXTENSION  
 1960-2000, No dummies 1960-2012  Trade (PPP and log), unadjusted GDP Trade (PPP, no log), GDP (PPP) 
 OLS PW OLS FE PW  OLS FE PW OLS FE PW 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
      
 
   
   
Lagged DV 0.914***  0.943*** 0.811***   0.894*** 0.746***  0.903*** 0.746***  
 (0.020)  (0.017) (0.024)   (0.025) (0.057)  (0.025) (0.022)  
Polity IV score 0.005 0.014* 0.003 0.007 0.037***  0.006 -0.001 0.043*** 0.008 -0.003 0.046*** 
 (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.007)  (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) 
Log trade openness 0.034 0.625*** -0.015 0.038 0.358***  0.138** 0.058 1.068*** 0.003** -0.005* 0.022*** 
 (0.044) (0.125) (0.041) (0.082) (0.124)  (0.061) (0.136) (0.236) (0.001) (0.002) (0.007) 
% population <15 0.006** 0.020** 0.002 0.000 -0.014  0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.012 -0.014 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.007) (0.012)  (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) (0.004) (0.015) (0.013) 
Log GDP 0.183 -0.605 0.162 0.851** -0.119  0.296 1.225* -0.668 0.070 0.528 -0.544 
 (0.180) (0.509) (0.158) (0.360) (0.531)  (0.298) (0.656) (0.732) (0.166) (0.395) (0.436) 
(Log GDP)² -0.003 0.020* -0.003 -0.017** 0.006  -0.006 -0.023* 0.012 -0.004 -0.024 0.023 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011)  (0.006) (0.013) (0.015) (0.007) (0.016) (0.018) 
Log population -0.055** -0.397*** -0.020 -0.259 -0.301***  -0.003 0.272 0.113 0.016 -0.238 -0.033 
 (0.023) (0.058) (0.022) (0.171) (0.065)  (0.036) (0.454) (0.121) (0.036) (0.396) (0.191) 
Government exp. 0.006 0.045*** 0.007* 0.015** 0.036***  0.002 0.028*** 0.028** 0.002 0.025*** 0.026** 
 (0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)  (0.007) (0.011) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013) 
Year -0.003 -0.006 0.001 0.005 -0.003  -0.002 -0.008 -0.029*** -0.002 0.011 -0.024** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) (0.006)  (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 4.533 22.28 -3.190 -15.07 13.74  0.526 -4.707 66.75*** 3.103 -19.89 56.63*** 
 (5.540) (15.40) (4.996) (11.18) (13.49)  (10.01) (20.01) (23.12) (7.326) (18.20) (21.36) 
      
 
   
   
N 1161 1578 2016 2016 2577  900 900 1205 889 889 1192 
Countries 126 140 141 141 148  125 125 137 125 125 137 
R² 0.90 0.50 0.91 0.92 0.49  0.90 0.91 0.55 0.90 0.91 0.56 
Within R²    0.71    0.63   0.62  
Coefficients and SE in (.), significance levels: 0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01*** Dependent variable: total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP. OLS and PW with PCSE, FE with 
robust SE. OLS and PW with regional dummies, omitted region is North America. Within country R²-values for FE models from Stata’s xtreg command, adjusted R² from areg. 
Standard R² for OLS and PW.
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B Data and variables 
 
Table B.1: Comparison of the two (non-logarithmized) trade openness measures  
 
    
 
    
 AVELINO ET AL. (2005) 
 TRADE OPENNESS PPP  TRADE OPENNESS  TRADE OPENNESS PPP TRADE OPENNESS 
Country Mean Std. dev. Min Max  Mean Std. dev. min max  Min Max Min Max 
Argentina  9.586 4.95 3.145 17.80  16.95 3.481 11.54 23.32  4.8 16.3 11.6 23.3 
Bolivia  13.42 2.123 10.76 17.42  48.07 3.828 41.89 58.47  15.4 25.3 41.9 58.5 
Brazil 6.678 2.184 3.905 10.45  17.43 2.259 14.39 21.47  6.1 13.0 13.2 22.2 
Chile  22.60 5.265 14.04 30.46  54.84 6.502 40.62 66.04  22.7 47.4 40.6 67.1 
Colombia  8.841 3.181 5.860 14.73  31.83 4.288 23.67 36.15  6.6 13.5 23.7 37.2 
Costa Rica  27.57 10.51 16.43 49.52  73.04 13.94 53.98 97.67  19.0 44.0 61.8 97.6 
Dominican 
Republic  23.78 10.02 11.26 38.10 
 67.15 15.84 32.71 83.18  14.4 35.6 32.7 78.0 
Guatemala  13.57 3.654 8.915 20.77  39.14 6.744 24.93 47.11  10.4 21.0 24.9 47.1 
Honduras  20.19 4.596 15.34 30.56  73.48 17.61 48.79 100.5  17.4 33.5 47.9 100.5 
Mexico  12.85 7.281 5.235 27.93  39.12 14.12 23.34 63.51  10.2 39.9 23.3 63.5 
Nicaragua  17.31 6.201 9.302 28.85  56.61 17.70 25.53 97.73  9.6 23.5 25.5 119.2 
Panama  62.23 14.23 44.14 84.29  161.44 26.56 125.21 198.8  37.8 66.4 63.0 99.1 
Peru  8.855 3.159 4.397 14.03  32.34 5.311 23.69 41.82  5.8 17.6 23.7 41.8 
El Salvador  14.67 5.909 8.449 25.68  53.31 7.933 36.93 67.41  9.5 25.4 36.9 67.4 
Uruguay  19.17 6.108 12.23 29.84  39.92 4.900 31.62 49.29  17.8 32.6 31.6 49.3 
 
A selection of Latin American countries and their values of trade openness (PPP) and unadjusted trade openness shows that the importance of trade is 
usually overstated when PPP are not considered. In addition, the standard deviation for the conventional measure is higher in most cases. The Latin 
American sample has been chosen for a comparison with Avelino et al. (2005), who propose the PPP-adjusted measure. In most countries, the results 
are comparable. 
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Table B.2: Summary statistics for Mulligan et al. (2004) 
VARIABLE N MEAN STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Education spending  116 3.797 1.594 1.022 10.22 
Democracy index 138 0.322 0.388 0 1 
Communist dummy 138 0.167 0.374 0 1 
British legal origin 138 0.312 0.465 0 1 
% population >65 138 5.209 3.484 1.643 14.93 
Log(population)/10 138 0.882 0.161 0.537 1.372 
Log real GDP p.c. 129 7.721 1.039 5.662 9.79 
Log trade 133 3.952 0.575 2.433 5.735 
Log trade PPP 127 3.013 0.703 1.458 4.971 
 
 
Table B.3: Summary statistics for Stasavage (2005), 1980-1996 
VARIABLE N MEAN OVERALL STD. DEV. 
WITHIN 
STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Education spending 650 4.357 2.184 1.398 0.580 16.06 
Multiparty competition 2491 0.099 0.298 0.274 0 1 
Election year 1661 0.105 0.307 0.300 0 1 
Log GDP p.c. 661 10.85 2.080 0.184 5.654 14.41 
Log GDP p.c. PPP 1273 7.202 0.981 0.256 5.016 10.35 
Aid in % GDP 670 15.07 14.20 8.379 0.001 94.44 
% rural population 2444 72.72 14.87 9.032 13.85 97.96 
% population <15 2392 43.88 3.627 2.529 21.40 50.04 
Log trade  2051 4.086 0.534 0.303 2.310 5.618 
Log trade PPP 1242 3.167 0.646 0.350 1.509 5.348 
Trade PPP 1246 30.05 25.95 12.17 2.567 210.2 
 
 
Table B.4: Summary statistics for Ansell 1960-2000 
VARIABLE N MEAN OVERALL STD. DEV. 
WITHIN 
STD. DEV. MIN MAX 
Education spending 1870 4.318 2.112 1.274 0 44.33 
Polity IV 5311 -0.338 7.653 4.011 -10 10 
Log Trade 5382 4.082 0.661 0.281 0.062 6.021 
Log Trade PPP 3038 3.244 0.733 0.292 0.943 5.586 
Trade PPP 3038 33.66 28.79 11.18 2.567 266.7 
Population >15 7461 36.82 9.427 3.498 14.32 53.03 
Log GDP 5991 22.22 2.440 0.958 15.99 29.92 
Log GDP PPP 6087 8.883 2.404 0.938 2.404 16.11 
Log population 8407 14.67 2.385 0.286 8.361 20.99 
Government Exp. 1741 12.33 5.710 2.968 1.836 64.28 
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Table B.5: Data sources and transformations for Mulligan et al. (2004) 
 
DESCRIPTION NAME IN SOURCE/TRANSFORMATION SECONDARY SOURCE PRIMARY SOURCE 
Public education spending Average (se_xpd_totl_gd_zs) Mulligan et al. dataset UNESCO 
Democracy index Average of Polity IV democracy, 1960-1990 Mulligan et al. dataset PolityIV 
Communist  Dummy Mulligan et al. dataset Kornai 
British legal origin Dummy Mulligan et al. dataset World Bank Global Development Network 
Growth Database 
Percentage of population 
aged 65+ 
Average (sp_pop_65up_to_zs) Mulligan et al. dataset ILO (International Labor Organization) 
Population Log(average population)/10 Mulligan et al. dataset ILO 
GDP p.c. Log(average GDP per capita), 1960-89 Mulligan et al. dataset PWT (Penn World Tables) 
Share of value added from 
agriculture 
Average (nv_agr_totl_zs) Mulligan et al. dataset WDI (World Bank Development Indicators) 
GDP p.c. PPP Log(average of cgdp)  PWT 
Trade openness PPP Log(average[( ne_exp_gnfs_cd+ 
ne_imp_gnfs_cd)/ ny_gdp_pcap_pp_cd]*100) 
 WDI 
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Table B.6: Data sources and transformations for Stasavage (2005) 
 
DESCRIPTION NAME IN SOURCE/TRANSFORMATION SECONDARY SOURCE PRIMARY SOURCE 
Public education spending se_xpd_totl_gd_zs  WDI (UNESCO) 
Multiparty competition Dummy if sexec2b=6  
(Pessimistic Executive Scale) 
 Institutions Data Set, Africa Research 
Program, Harvard 
Election year Presidential election dummy (gol_preel)  Quality of Government Institute 
GDP p.c. Log (ny_gdp_pcap_kn)  WDI 
Aid in % GDP Dt_oda_alld_gd_zs  WDI 
% population rural Sp_rur_totl_zs  WDI 
% population <15 Sp_pop_0014_to_zs  WDI 
Trade openness Log (ne_trd_gnfs_zs)  WDI 
GDP p.c. PPP Log(wdi_gdpc) Quality of Government 
Institute 
WDI 
Trade openness PPP Log([( ne_exp_gnfs_cd+ ne_imp_gnfs_cd)/ 
ny_gdp_pcap_pp_cd]*100) 
 WDI 
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Table B.7: Data sources and transformations for Ansell (2008) 
 
DESCRIPTION NAME IN SOURCE/TRANSFORMATION PRIMARY SOURCE 
Public Education Spending se_xpd_totl_gd_zs WDI (UNESCO) 
Polity IV score Polity2 PolityIV 
Trade openness  Log (ne_trd_gnfs_zs) WDI 
% population < 15 Sp_pop_0014_to_zs WDI 
GDP Log(ny_gdp_mktp_cd) WDI 
Log population Log(sp_pop_totl) WDI 
Government expenditures ne_con_govt_zs - se_xpd_totl_gd_zs WDI 
Region dummies 
Region1 = East Asia and Pacific,  
Region2 = Europe and Central Asia, 
Region3 = Latin America, 
Region4 = MENA 
Region5 = North America (omitted in all models) 
Region6 = South Asia 
Region7 = Sub-Saharan Africa 
WDI 
GDP PPP Log(tcgdp) PWT 
Trade openness PPP Log([( ne_exp_gnfs_cd+ ne_imp_gnfs_cd)/ 
ny_gdp_pcap_pp_cd]*100) WDI 
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C Literature overview 
 
Table C.1: Overview of empirical models explaining public spending (on education) 
Article Data Estimation  Dependent variable 
Lag-
ged 
DV 
Main independent 
variables Interaction effects Results 
Lott (1999) TSCS, 99 
countries, 
1985-1992 
FE Current real public 
school expenditures 
per capita 
no Totalitarianism 
index by Freedom 
House 
Totalitarianism*G
DP/Population 
Totalitarianism (+)***, interaction (-) 
sometimes significant 
Kaufman 
and Segura-
Ubiergo 
(2001) 
TSCS, 14 
Latin 
American 
countries, 
1973-1997 
Time and 
country 
fixed 
effects, 
OLS with 
PCSE 
Public welfare 
spending and 
health+education 
expenditures (in per 
capita 1995 dollars, % 
of GDP, % of central 
government spending) 
yes Polity, trade and 
capital mobility; all 
in levels and first 
differences 
For welfare 
spending: 
trade*capital 
mobility  
Welfare spending: 
Polity (-), trade (-)**, capital mobility mostly 
insignificant, interaction effect  
(-)***; 
Health+education expenditures: 
Polity mostly (+)**, trade (-), capital mixed 
results 
Rudra and 
Haggard 
(2001) 
TSCS, 57 
less 
developed 
countries, 
1972-1997 
PW with 
PCSE 
Social security and 
welfare spending, 
education spending (% 
of total government 
spending) 
no Trade, capital flows, 
Polity, potential 
labor power 
no Social security and welfare: 
Trade(-), capital flows (+)*, Polity (+)*** 
Education spending: 
Trade(-)**, capital flows (+), Polity (+) 
Rudra 
(2002) 
TSCS, 53 
less 
developed 
countries, 
1972-1995 
FE Welfare spending (% 
of GDP, % of total 
government spending, 
per capita) 
yes Trade, capital flows, 
democracy, 
potential labor 
power (PLP) 
Trade*PLP, 
capflows*PLP 
Trade mixed, capital flows (+)*, democracy 
(+)**, PLP (+)** 
Interaction effects (-)* 
Bueno de 
Mesquita et 
al. (2003) 
TSCS, 
N>3000 
FE Education 
Expenditures 
no Size of the winning 
coalition, size of the 
selectorate 
no Winning coalition (+)***, selectorate (+)*** 
Plümper and 
Martin 
(2003) 
Cross-
sectional, 
83 
countries 
OLS Government spending 
(% of GDP) 
no Polity, Polity 
squared, 
institutional 
openness 
no Polity (-)**, Polity squared (+)**, institutional 
openness (+) 
Sign of the coefficient in (.), significance levels: 0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01***. 
  
48 
Article Data Estimation  Dependent variable 
Lag-
ged 
DV 
Main independent 
variables Interaction effects Results 
Brown and 
Hunter 
(2004) 
TSCE, 17 
Latin 
American 
countries, 
1980-1997 
PW with 
PCSE 
Per capita education 
spending 
no Polity, health and 
social security 
spending, trade 
no Polity (+)**, health and social security 
spending (+)**, trade (-) 
Hausken et 
al (2004) 
Cross-
sectional, 
83 
countries 
OLS Government spending 
(% of GDP) 
no Polity, Polity 
squared, 
institutional 
openness to trade 
no Polity (-)***,  
Polity squared (+)***, institutional openness 
to trade (-)**  
Mulligan et 
al. (2004) 
Cross-
sectional, 
110 
countries, 
1960-1990 
averages 
OLS Education spending 
(% of GDP) 
no Polity, share of 
value added from 
agriculture, 
communist 
no Polity (+), agriculture (-)***, communist 
(+)*** 
Avelino et 
al. (2005) 
TSCS, 19 
Latin 
American 
countries, 
1980-1999 
OLS with 
PCSE, PW 
Social spending (% of 
GDP), education 
spending (% of GDP) 
yes Democracy dummy 
based on Alvarez et 
al. (1996), trade 
openness (in PPP), 
financial openness 
(Quinn, 1997) 
For social 
spending: 
democracy*trade, 
democracy*financi
al openness  
Social spending: 
Democracy (+)***, trade (+)**, financial 
openness not significant, democracy*trade (-), 
democracy*financial openness  
(-)** 
Education spending:  
Democracy (+)***, trade (+)***, financial 
openness (-) 
Stasavage 
(2005) 
TSCS, 44 
African 
countries, 
1980-1996 
OLS with 
PCSE, FE 
Total government 
spending on education 
(% of GDP, % of total 
spending) 
no Multiparty 
competition, 
election year, aid 
no Education spending in % of GDP: 
Multiparty (+)**, election year (mixed), aid (-
)* 
Education spending in % of total spending: 
Multiparty (+)***, election year (-), aid (-)** 
Ansell 
(2008) 
TSCS, 113 
countries, 
1960-2000 
OLS with 
PCSE, FE 
Public expenditure on 
education (% of GDP) 
yes Polity, trade 
openness, 
Hiscox/Kastner 
openness 
no Polity (+)**, trade openness (+)**, 
Hiscox/Kastner (-)*** 
Sign of the coefficient in (.), significance levels: 0.1*, 0.05**, 0.01***. 
